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Implications of Policy Regulations on
Land Applications of Poultry Litter
Ramu Govindasamy and Mark J. Cochran
The growth of the poultry industry in Arkansas has exploded in the past decade. As a result,
approximately 1.5 million tons of litter are produced every year. Concerns about possible
contamination of ground and surface water from land applications of poultry litter have been
raised. This paper compares four policy scenarios in terms of their efficiency and practicality
to manage land applications of poultry litter. The results indicate that a litter tax per ton of
litter applied could achieve the same level of litter control as that of a land tax on litter ..
atwlications, but at a lower tax rate.
Nonpoint source pollution created by agriculture is
one of the most damaging and widespread threats
to a clean environment (National Research Council
1989). Activities such as excessive fertilizer and
pesticide applications and improper animal waste
management have gained attention in the recent
past (Prato, Xu, and Jenner 1992a, 1992b, 1992c,
1992d; Prato et al. 1991). The growth of the poul-
try industry in Arkansas has exploded in the past
decade. Approximately 24 million chickens, 25
million turkeys, and 1billion broilers are produced
every year in the state (Buchberger, Cochran, and
Govindasamy 1993; Govindasamy and Cochran
1995a, 1995b), As a result, approximately 1.5 mil-
lion tons of litter are produced every year. Most
poultry litter in northwest Arkansas, the region
with the greatest poultry concentrations, is applied
as a fertilizer to nearby pasture lands consisting of
bermuda grass and tall fescue (Cochran and Govin-
dasamy 1994; Cochran et al. 1993).
Concentrated litter production may result in lit-
ter applications that exceed the nutrient require-
ments of the local forage, creating a potential to
contaminate surface and groundwater (Govin-
dasamy et al. 1994; Govindasamy and Cochran
1994). Concerns have been expressed about pos-
sible contamination by nitrates, phosphorus, and
bacteria in water arising from land applications of
litter (Xu and Prato 1995; Xu, Prato and Fulcher
1993; Xu and Prato 1993, 1992).
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In northwest Arkansas, the number of wells with
N-nitrate levels above the maximum contamina-
tion level (MCL) of 10 ppm has increased in the
past few years (Steele, McAllister, and Adamski
1990). In this same period, the poultry industry
experienced substantial growth. A summary of Ar-
kansas water mineral quality data, in 1971 and
1972, reported less than 2.2% of the sample wells
tested were above the MCL for nitrates, whereas,
in 1986, 14V0of the tested wells were above the
MCL (Madison and Brunett 1985). The Arkansas
nonpoint source pollution assessment concluded
from 1988 monitoring data that in the Ozark High-
lands region, “nitrate levels ., . are consistently
high and few streams meet the primary contact
recreational standards due to high fecal coliform
concentrations” (Arkansas Department of Pollu-
tion Control and Ecology 1990).
There is a need to analyze the alternative litter
management policies to prevent problems from ni-
trate (N), phosphorus (P), and bacterial loadings.
Although there exist numerous policy tools such as
taxes, permits, and quantity restrictions to control
land applications of poultry litter, only some are
suitable for a given environment. The efficiency of
each of these possible tools and their practicality in
the real world should be examined before imple-
mentation, The objective of this paper is to com-
pare four policy scenarios in terms of their effi-
ciency, impact on litter use, and practicality to
manage land applications of poultry litter. These
include (1) a per ton litter tax; (2) a land tax on
litter applications; (3) a quantity restriction on litter
applications and land treated with litter; and (4) a
permit system to control litter applications and
land treated with litter, A programming model is
linked with a Geographic Information System with86 April 1998 Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
an objective of maximizing the regional forage in-
come. The model also incorporates the option of
transporting the litter to areas that are less sensitive
to surface and groundwater contamination.
Methods
A programming model is formulated using the
General Algebraic Modeling System (GAMS)
(Brooke, Kendrick, and Meerus 1988). The objec-
tive function in this model maximizes regional for-
age income from the Muddy Fork watershed of the
Illinois River in Washington County in northwest
Arkansas. Based on previous studies (Govin-
dasamy, Cochran, and Buchberger 1994), it is as-
sumed that bermuda grass can be sold for $50 per
ton and tall fescue can be sold for $25 per ton. To
formulate the mathematical programming model,
specific soil units were aggregated into a manage-
able number of soil classes based on the physical
characteristics determining yield responses. The
soil resources data were provided by the Depart-
ment of Agronomy at the University of Arkansas,
Fayetteville (Scott et al. 1992), The study area con-
sists of nine major soil series: Captina (6), Enders
(11), Hector-Mountainburg (16), Jay (17), Johns-
burg (18), Linker (20), Pembroke (23), Savannah
(28), and Summit (31). The other minor soil series
were aggregated together for simplicity (repre-
sented as series O).In terms of physical character-
istics of the soil, Captina, Jay, and Pembroke be-
long to silt loam with 1–3% slope; Johnsburg be-
longs to silt loam with Oslope; Enders belongs to
gravelly loam with 3–8’%0 slope; Hector-
Mountainburg belongs to gravelly fine sandy
loams with 3–8% slope; Linker belongs to loam
with 1–3% slope; Savannah belongs to fine sandy
loam with 1–3% slope; and Summit belongs to
silty clay with O–1% slope.
The inputs to the programming model were de-
rived from field experiments and standard budget-
ing. The budgeting of profits per acre was carried
out using field experimental data on yield, input
costs, and output prices of bermuda grass and tall
fescue on ten different soil series, with five differ-
ent application rates (O, 1, 2, 3, and 4 tons per
acre), and four different times of litter application
(spring, summer, fall, fall/spring [implies applica-
tion in both fall and spring]). Budget data calcula-
tions were based upon experimental yield re-
sponses, Cooperative Extension Service (CES)
budgets, and Soil Conservation Service (SCS) pro-
ductivity indices. Extrapolations from actual ex-
perimental yields using SCS productivity indices
were necessary to cover all the range of soil
classes, rates, and times of application. The yield
response data collected form the field experiments
take into account the fertility status of the soils
depending on the level of nutrients such as phos-
phorus, nitrogen, and potassium.
The baseline mathematical programming model
can be divided into five sections (Buchberger
1991), First, the objective function maximizes the
regional forage income over variable costs from
various activities consisting of tall fescue and ber-
muda grass net of poultry litter storage costs. The
objective function of the maximization problem














is regional forage income
is grass species, either tall fescue or bermuda grass
is aggregated soil series
is rate of poultry litter application
is time period of litter application
is storage time
is price of grass species I
is activity or acres of ith grass on jth soil, with kth rate
of poultry litter application (O, 1, 2, 3, 4 tons per
acre) in kh time period (fall, spring, summer, and
fall/spring)
are yields associated with ith, jth, kth, kh activity
is cost of producing ith grass with kth rate of poultry
litter application (O, 1, 2, 3, 4 tons per acre)
is opportunity cost of poultry litter in the local market
($ per ton)
is the quantity of poultry litter that has to be trans-
ported from the area, which is equal to total supply
of litter minus total amount applied to pasture (tons)
is the cost of building stackkg sheds
is the litter that has to be stored and applied during mth
period
is acres of ith grass on jth soil, with kth rate of poultry
litter application in m time period.
The variable XiJ,k,lis optimized for profit, That
is, the model would choose the forage crop, soil
type, poultry litter rate, and the time period of ap-
plication to maximize the profit, subject to stated
constraints. In each scenario, based on a survey on
litter use in northwest Arkansas (Rutherford 1993),
two poultry litter price subscenarios or opportunity
cost (A) were analyzed: (1) sale price of litter $7
per ton and (2) disposal cost of litter $0 per ton.
The sale price of litter at $7 per ton represents the
practice of selling litter to neighboring farmers,
whereas $0 disposal cost represents the practice of
trading litter for poultry housecleaning.Govindasamy and Cochran Policy Implications of Litter Application Regulations 87
Second, the soil class acre constraints place an
upper bound on the number of acres available on
each of the ten soil series covering approximately
47,000 acres, out of which 29,950 acres are cur-






where ACREj is the available acres of jth soil.
Third, the government cost-sharing in the proj-
ect is incorporated to analyze the impact of the
water quality project on regional forage income.
The program is a joint action of the Natural Re-
sources Conservation Service (NRCS), the Agri-
cultural Stabilization and Conservation Service
(ASCS), and the CES. It provides about $1 million
through government funds as a cost-sharing pro-
gram for building stacking sheds in the study area.
The government cost-sharing program is repre-
sented as
21054
(3) Xxxz Xij,k,l G s 1,000,000,
1=1 j=l k=l 1=1
where G is the government participation in the pro-
gram ($ per acre). The model requires poultry
growers to build stacking sheds with capacity for
storing 100 tons of poultty litter per year. The pro-
gram covers 75% of building costs, and the rest is
provided by farmers. The stacking sheds not only
minimize the loss of nutrients from the litter but
also allow growers to apply litter at times other
than immediately following the traditional clean
out, thus reducing the potential surface and
groundwater contamination.
Fourth, a litter quantity constraint is included in
the model to ensure that the applied litter is less
than or equal to the available litter. It was esti-
mated that in the watershed, 30,187 tons of litter
are produced annually. The litter use constraint can
be symbolically represented as
where
PLk is rate of litter applied at level k (tons per acre)
T is the quantity of poultry litter that has to be trans-
ported from the area (tons)
M is quantity of litter produced in the watershed (tons).
Fifth, a constraint on the available forage area
was introduced. Davis et al. (1987) suggest that in
accordance with the climate, soil fertility, and
grazing management in the study area, at least two
times more acreage should be planted in tall fescue
than bermuda grass in order to balance seasonal
demands of a year-round cattle herd. This pasture
and forage availability constraint can be repre-
sented as
where F represents tall fescue and B represents
bermuda grass.
Alternative policy scenarios were constructed
consisting of a tax per ton of litter applied; a tax
per acre of land treated with litter; a quantity re-
striction on litter applications and land treated with
litter; and a permit system for litter applications.
The Pigouvian litter tax scenario introduces a
per unit tax on litter use for crop production,
whereas the land tax introduces a tax on land
treated with poultry litter. The use of such taxes
can eliminate the difference between the marginal
social cost and marginal private cost schedules of a
farm responsible for an external diseconomy. The
use of tax instruments restructures the policy in-
formation requirements from persistent monitoring
for efficient point-to-point regulation to data that
ensure that tax rates reflect marginal social costs.
However, it should be noted that the marginal so-
cial costs are often not known, so the optimal Pi-
gouvian tax cannot be determined, Therefore, the
amount of externality that gets internalized by an
arbitrary tax may not be optimal.
In terms of efficiency criteria, taxes can inter-
nalize external costs directly to producers and con-
sumers of products responsible for environmental
deterioration. Although taxes are appealing from
an efficiency perspective, significant business op-
position exists to any environmental taxation
policy. The roots of this opposition are, fundamen-
tally, the distributional effects of taxes, the fall in
output, higher prices, and a decrease in profits
(Seneca and Taussig 1974).
If a tax policy is implemented, it should be easy
to administer compared with other policies. We
examine a per ton litter tax and a land tax on litter
applications in terms of a favorable environment
for implementation and monitoring. A tax on litter
is difficult to monitor, whereas a tax on land can be
relatively easier to monitor. In both the litter tax
and the land tax we use three opportunity costs of
litter in the local market and three litter tax rates/
land tax rates to analyze the impact of policy on
optimal use.
Centrally planned and directed environmental
policy tools such as Pigouvian taxes and subsidies88 April 1998 Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
often not only require information but also raise
difficulties for the calculation of optimal tax rates.
Estimation of the money value of the marginal
damage to impose optimal taxes or subsidies is
hindered by the various limitations to the estima-
tion of damage to human health and the environ-
ment. The use of a predetermined standard or
quantity restriction is another environmental policy
tool that can be based on health and safety consid-
erations.
The use of taxes, subsidies, or marketable per-
mits possesses one important property. That is, un-
der appropriate conditions, these policy tools can
achieve environmental goals at a least cost. Con-
sider the case of poultry litter. Suppose that the
litter application has to be constrained to X tons in
a watershed consisting of two soil types that have
the same marginal damage function. A litter appli-
cation quantity restriction would imply that each
soil type should be constrained to receive not more
than X/2 tons of litter. However, it may be a cost-
lier solution, if the marginal values of the two soils
are not equal. To achieve efficiency, the soil with
low marginal value should be assigned a lower
quota (in other words, less than X/2 tons of litter)
than the soil with high marginal value.
Now consider the properties of marketable per-
mits to control environmental pollution. In general,
the marketable permit system idea is appealing
from the efficiency point of view because it pos-
sesses the least-cost property (Baumol and Oats
1988). The marketable permit system defines prop-
erty rights for environmental resources and then
offers them for sale to the highest bidder (Dales
1968). The permit system has some advantages
over effluent fees for the attainment of a set of
predetermined environmental standards. First, a
permit system reduces the uncertainty and adjust-
ment costs in attaining legally required levels of
environmental quality. Second, by using the permit
system, one can avoid the complications that result
from economic growth and price inflation in using
the fee system. Third, at the time of the introduc-
tion of the scheme, a permit system can be intro-
duced smoothly by issuing free permits, whereas
the fee system will pose a threat to the existing
firms. Fourth, permits already exist and therefore it
may be a less radical step for introduction than a
fee system.
Some limitations do exist for practical imple-
mentation of marketable permit systems. First, it
might be cumbersome to establish the carrying ca-
pacity of the watershed in terms of pounds of litter
that can be applied, Second, the transaction costs
of creating a functional market for the permits
should be assessed prior to implementation. We
also note that there is an upper bound on the trans-
action cost associated with the permit for the sys-
tem to be efficient. Third, it might be difficult to
control overapplication of poultry litter on environ-
mentally sensitive lands, especially when that land
has a high value of marginal product (VMP) of
litter. Since the permits are tradable, only those
producers with high VMP of litter can afford to
buy the permits at a high price. Finally, some may
object to marketable permits since they are viewed
as a license to pollute.
The baseline scenario depicts the simulation
without any restriction on poultry use or land
treated with litter, It should be noted that a tax on
land treated with litter would be easier to monitor
than a tax on litter applications. Tax on litter ap-
plications could be approximated by a per bird tax,
which has been suggested in the past. A per ton
litter tax was introduced by modifying the objec-
tive function as follows:
(6)
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where TLIT represents the unit tax on litter ap-
plied. As can be seen from equation (6), an in-
crease in the tax on litter reduces the regional for-
age income, forcing the optimal solution to choose
a practice with low litter application rate.
A land tax on litter applications was introduced
by modifying the objective function as follows:
(7)
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where TLAND represents the land tax on litter
applications. As can be seen from equation (7), the
third term with a negative sign imposes a tax on
every acre of land treated with litter. Note that the
k is summed from 2 to 5 so that a land tax is not
imposed when litter is not applied. Parallel to equa-
tion (6), a tax on land reduces the incentive to
apply litter to many acres. Although it is possibleGovindasamy and Cochran Policy Implications of Li[ter Applica~ion Regulations 89
to impose a land tax based on the carrying capacity
of the soils, we limit our analysis to a single tax so
that the results can be compared with a single litter
tax.
The quantity restriction was introduced in two
ways. First, a restriction on the quantity of litter
applied was introduced for each of the ten soil
series as follows:
254
(8) ~~~ (xij,k,lp~k) s cARcApj,
1=1 k=l 1=1
where CARCAP represents the carrying capacity
of each soil series in the watershed. The carrying
capacity of soil series was estimated based on
Scott, Mauromoustako, and Gilmour’s study
(1994) of phosphorus uptake of pasture lands,
Equation (8) introduces a limit on the maximum
use of litter for each soil series, Second, a restric-
tion on the amount of land treated with litter was
introduced for each of the ten soil series as follows:
254
(9) ~~~ (xij,k,l)/(k > 1) s PLIMIT~,
1=1 k=l 1=1
where PLIMIT~represents the number of acres that
is capable of receiving litter applications based on
the soil test phosphorus for each soil type.
A permit system was also introduced in two
ways. First, a permit system for the use of litter in
each soil series was introduced as follows:
(lo)
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Equation (8) places a constraint on litter applica-
tions for each soil series, whereas equation (10)
places a constraint on litter applications for the
entire watershed because the permits are tradable
within the watershed. Second, a permit system for
land treated with litter was introduced for each of
the ten soil series as follows:
(11)
21054 10
Parallel to equations (8) and (10), equation (9)
places a constraint on land treated with litter for
each soil series, whereas equation (11) places a
constraint on land treated with litter for the entire
watershed. That is, the permit system would allow
for the choice of land treated with litter within the
watershed, whereas the quantity restriction will
limit the choice within each soil series.
Results
The results are discussed in terms of four sce-
narios: (1) per ton litter tax scenario; (2) land tax
on litter applications scenario; (3) quantity restric-
tion scenario; and (4) permit scenario.
Per Ton Litter Tax Scenario
The litter tax scenario is analyzed in terms of the
entire watershed as well as the individual soil se-
ries. We assume that the litter either can be sold at
a price (opportunity cost of litter) of $0, $2.50, $5,
or $7 per ton of litter, or can be used for crop
production with a Pigouvian tax on litter applied
for crop production at $0, $5, $10, or $15 per ton.
The Pigouvian tax rates were chosen in such a way
that the optimal litter use is comparable to quantity
restrictions. That is, the optimal litter use after the
litter tax is similar to imposed quantity restriction.
As a result, one can compare the cost of litter
restriction between two policy tools, given that the
litter applied is the same, The upper bound on the
opportunity cost of litter at $7 per ton was chosen
based on a survey of poultry producers conducted
in Arkansas (Rutherford 1993). The results of the
entire watershed analysis are presented in table 1.
When the opportunity cost of litter was $0, with no
tax on litter, it was optimal to apply all the litter at
an average rate of 3.02 tons per acre.
When the opportunity cost of litter was $0, the
solution indicated that the optimal rate of litter ap-
plication remained at 3.02 tons per acre with a litter
tax rate of $5, $10, or $15 per ton. When the op-
portunity cost was $2.50 per ton of litter, the op-
timal solution did not change at a litter tax rate of
$5 and $10 per ton. However, when the litter tax
rate increased to $15 per ton, the optimal litter use
dropped to 2 tons per acre. Approximately 34% of
the litter was sold in the market at a price of $2.50
per ton of litter. With an increase in the opportunity
cost of litter use to $5 per ton, the optimal solution
indicated that all the litter should be used for crop
production at a tax rate of $5 and $10 per ton. With
a tax rate of$15 per ton of litter, it was optimal to
sell all the litter in the market at a price of $5 per
ton.
When the opportunity cost increased to $7 per
ton of litter, with a tax rate of $5 per ton of litter,
it was optimal to use all the litter for crop produc-
tion. However, when the tax rate increased to $10
per ton, it was optimal to apply only 2 tons per
acre, At the same opportunity cost, when the tax
rate increased to $15 per ton of litter, it was not
optimal to use any litter for crop production within90 April 1998 Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
Table 1. ImDacts of Tax on Litter
Lhter
Opportunity Tax on Litter Treated Litter Litter Use Tax
cost” Litter Use Area Transported Per Acre Revenue
($/ton) ($/ton) (tons) (acres) (tons) (tons/acre) ($/watershed)
o 0 30,187 9,983 0 3.02
0
0
5 30,187 9,983 0 3.02 150,940
0 10 30,187 9,983 0 3.02 301,870
0 15 30,187 9,987 0 3.02 452,810
2.5 5 30,187 9,987 0 3.02 150,940
2.5 10 30,187 9,987 0 3.02 301,870
2.5 15 19,966 9,983 10,220 2.00 299,500
5 5 30,187 9,983 0 3.02 I50,940
5 10 30,187 9,983 0
5
3.02 301,870
15 0 0 30,187
7
0 0
5 30,187 9,983 0 3.02 150,940
7 10 19,966 9,983 10,220 2.00 199,660
7 15 0 0 30,187 0 0
‘Opportunity cost represents the selling price of litter in the local market,
the watershed. The tax revenues varied consider-
ably by tax rates and the opportunity cost of litter.
At high opportunity costs, tax revenues are maxi-
mized at a tax rate of $10 per ton. As expected, the
increase in tax rates reduced the use of litter in the
watershed for a given level of the opportunity cost
of the litter. The increase in the opportunity cost of
litter for a given level of tax rate also encourages
reduction in litter use within the watershed, since
there are viable economic alternatives to local land
applications of litter.
Consider the impact of changes in tax rates and
the opportunity cost of litter on the individual soil
series optimal solutions. The choice set of the op-
timal litter application rates in the case of indi-
vidual soil series were reduced to O,2, and 4 tons
per acre to analyze the changes in the optimal so-
lutions for a change in the tax rate. Although the
increase in tax rates decreases the optimal litter use
for the entire watershed, the change in the optimal
litter use in each of the soil series depends on the
relative VMP of litter in different soil series. The
optimal solutions for five soil series among the ten
remained unchanged at all tax rates and opportu-
nity cost of litter.
In the rest of the soil series, while the litter use
increased with tax increases in some soil series, in
others, the litter use decreased. It should be noted
that cycling of the optimal solutions occurred with
increased taxes due to the nature of profit functions
and the relative VMP of litter in different soil se-
ries. No general conclusions can be reached about
the impact of taxes on the intensity of litter use in
each soil series as the potential for cycling will be
determined by specific profit functions, making it
an empirical question for each watershed.
Land Tax on Litter Applications Scenario
The land tax scenario is also discussed in terms of
the entire watershed and individual soil series. As
in the litter tax scenario, we assumed that the litter
either can be sold at a price (opportunity cost of
litter) of $0,$2,50, $5, or $7 per ton of litter, or can
be used for crop production with a tax on land
treated with litter of $0, $50, $75, or $100 per acre.
The land taxes were chosen in such a way that the
optimal litter uses are comparable to quantity re-
strictions. As expected, although a tax on land re-
duced the number of litter-treated acres, it in-
creased the optimal use of litter per acre.
First, consider the entire watershed. The results
are presented in table 2, When the opportunity cost
of litter was $0, a land tax of $50 and $75 per acre
reduced the litter treated land by 50% and 38Y0,
respectively. However, all the litter was being used
for crop production, with an increase of 8 tons per
acre in the litter application rate. When the land tax
increased to $100 per acre, the optimal solution
indicated that it is not optimal to apply any litter
for crop production within the watershed.
When the opportunity cost of litter use increased
to $2.50 from $0 per ton, the optimal solutions
remained the same. With an opportunity cost of $5
per ton of litter, the litter use remained the same at
a tax rate of $50 per acre. However, with a tax rate
of $75 and $100 per acre, it was not optimal to
apply any litter for crop production within the wa-
tershed. With an opportunity cost of litter at $7 per
ton, it was not optimal to apply any litter within the
watershed at any of the three tax rates. Once again
tax revenues vary considerably with rates and the
opportunity cost of the litter.Govindasamy and Cochran Policy Implications of Litter Application Regulations 91
Table 2. Impacta of Tax on Land Treated with Litter
Tax on Litter
Opportunity Littered Lhter Treated Litter Lhter Use Tax
Costa Land Use Area Transported Per Acre Revenue
($/ton) ($/acre) (tons) (acres) (tons) (tons/acre) ($/watershed)
o 0 30,187 9,983 0 3.02 0
0 50 30,187 5,031 0 6.00 251,560
0 75 30,187 3,773 0 8.00 283,010
0 100 0 0 30,187 0.00 0
2.5 50 30,187 5,031 0 6.00 251,560
2.5 75 30,187 3,773 0 8.00 283,000
2.5 100 0 0 30,187 0.00 0
5 50 30,187 5,031 0 6.00 251,560
5 75 0 0 30,187 3.02 0
5 100 0 0 30,187 0.00 0
7 50 0 0 30,187 0.00 0
7 75 0 0 30,187 0.00 0
7 100 0 0 30,187 0.00 0
‘Opportunity cost represents the selling price of litter in the local market.
Consider the impact of changes in land taxes on
individual soil series. Compared with the litter
taxes, the optimal solutions are relatively insensi-
tive to changes in land taxes and the opportunity
cost of litter. Because of the nature of the land tax,
it is optimal to apply either 8 tons per acre or none
depending on the level of taxes and opportunity
costs. As with the litter taxes, cycling of the opti-
mal solutions also occurred in the land taxes be-
cause of the nature of the profit functions of dif-
ferent soils and the relative VMP of litter in dif-
ferent soil series,
Quantity Restriction Scenario
The quantity restriction scenario consisted of a re-
striction on the amount of litter applied or a re-
striction on the land treated with litter. First, con-
sider the restriction on the amount of litter applied
on each of the ten soil series. The restriction on the
quantity of litter was derived based on the plant
uptake of phosphorus and the phosphorus content
of litter, because phosphorus is often cited as the
most limiting nutrient in local water bodies, This
limits the phosphorus loading to an amount
roughly equivalent to plant uptake. The phospho-
rus uptake by the pasture land is about 71.50
pounds per acre per year, and litter contains about
1.8870of phosphorus (Scott, Mauromoustakos, and
Gilmour 1994). Hence, the carrying capacity of
each soil series is about 3,803 pounds of litter per
acre.
The restriction on litter quantity was binding on
some soil series (table 3), The optimal litter rates
ranged from Oto 4 tons per acre depending on the
soil series. The total acres treated with litter and the
total litter use remained the same, whereas the
maximized regional forage income declined by 6970
compared with unconstrained maximization. The
quantity restriction distributes the litter among all
soil series, whereas the unconstrained maximiza-
tion distributes the litter to the most productive
soils.
Second, consider the restriction on the land
treated with litter. The restriction placed on the
land was based on a soil phosphorus test survey in
the study area (Govindasamy, Cochran, and Buch-
berger 1994). It indicates that, on average, 74% of
acres under each soil series does not exceed the
soil test P of 300 pounds per acre. The optimal
solution indicates that, although the constraint on
the land treated with litter is binding only for some
soils, all available litter is used in the watershed
(table 4). Therefore, restriction based on the soil
test P content allows for only redistribution of the
litter with no reduction in total litter use. When
compared with the unconstrained maximization,
the total acres treated with litter declined to 79%
and the maximized regional forage income de-
clined to 9790with no change in the litter use. The
optimal rates of litter application ranged from Oto
4 tons per acre, as opposed to Oto 8 tons per acre
in the case of restriction on the litter use.
Permit Scenario
The permit scenario deals with permits that are
tradable within the watershed. Permit systems can
consist of issuing either permits to apply litter or
permits to limit the land treated with litter. The92 April 1998 Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
Table 3. O~timal Solutions for Ouantitv Restriction vs. Permit Svstem for Poultrv Litter
Available Optimal
Soil Class % Slope
Optimal Quantity
Acres Permit Acres Restriction Acres
Captina 1–3% 2903 2903/B/SP/4” 1379n3/sP/4
1524/F/FL/O
Enders 3-8% 1467 14671F/FL/O 14671FlFL/O
Hector-Mountainburg 3–8% 2526 2526/F/FL/O 25261WFLI0
Jay 1–3% 1622 1622/B/SP/4 1541/B/FLSP/2
81iF/FL/o
Johnsburg 1919 1919/F/FL/O 12151BISP13
703/F/FL/o
Linker 1–3% 1470 147011VFLSP/2 1397/EtlFLSP/2
74/WFL/O
Pembroke 1–3% 1629 5851BISP14 774fBlsP14
695/B/FLSP/2 855/F/FL/O
349/F/FL/o
Savannah 1–3% 2708 2708/B/FLSP/2 6221BISP14
1327/f3/FLSP/2
758/F/FL/O





Total acres under litter 9983 9983
Total litter use (tons) 30187 30187
Maximized income for the watershed ($) 775780 731240
‘The codes for the optimrd solutions are: B = bermuda, F = fescue, SP = spring application, FL = fall application, and FLSP
= fall and spring applications. The last number represents the litter application rate.
number of permits to be issued for litter use and for land treated with litter are the same as that of the
the land treated with litter was based on the quan- quantity restriction scenario for the entire water-
tity restriction scenario, That is, the restriction on shed. But, in terms of individual soil series, there
the level of litter application and restriction on the was no restriction on the amount of litter applica-
Table 4. Optimal Solutions on Quantity Restriction vs. Permit System for Land Treated with
Poultry Litter
Available Optimal Optimal Quantity
Soil Class % Slope Acres Permit Acres Restriction Acres
Captina 1–3% 2903 2903iB/SP/4’ 6251B/FL/O
1858/B/SP/4
420/F/FL/O
Enders 3–8% 1467 1467/F/FL/O 1467/F/FL/O
Hector-Mountainburg 3–8% 2526 2526iFlFL/O 2526/F/FL/O





Linker 1–3% 1470 14701EvFLSP12 529/BiFL/O
Pembroke
9411B/sP/4
1–3% 1629 585/B/SP/4 lo43iB/sP/4
6951BIFLSP12 587/FiFL/O
349/F/FL/O
Savannah 1-3% 2708 2708/B/FLSP/2 9751WF’LIO
17331BISP14





Total acres under litter 9983 7854
Total litter use 30187 30187
Maximized income for the watershed 775780 749180
‘The codes for the optimal solutions are: B = bermuda, F = fescue, SP = spring application, FL = fall application, and FLSP
= fall and spring application. The last number represents tbe litter application rate.Govindasamy and Cochran Policy Implications of Litter Application Regulations 93
tion and land treated with litter. As a result, the
constraint for the entire watershed is more relaxed
than a quantity constraint for each soil series de-
picting the tradable permit system. With tradable
permits, although the limit on maximum litter ap-
plication level and land constraints are the same for
the entire watershed as that of quantity restriction,
the system redistributes the litter to soils with the
highest VMPS.
First, consider the permit system for the use of
litter. The number of permits to be issued will be
equal to the tons of litter to be applied for the entire
watershed, The limit on the tons of litter to be
applied for the entire watershed was arrived at in a
fashion similar to the quantity restriction scenario.
The results of this scenario are presented in table 3.
The optimal solution indicates that the total acres
treated with litter, the total litter used in the water-
shed, and the maximized regional forage income is
the same as that of the unconstrained solutions.
Second, consider the permit system for the land
treated with litter. The permit system for the land
treated with litter for the entire watershed was also
derived in a way similar to the quantity restriction
scenario. In fact, with the same restriction on land
treated with litter, there was no change in the op-
timal solutions compared with unconstrained
maxirrtization solutions under the permit system. In
comparison with the quantity restriction scenario,
the total acres treated with litter increased by 27%,
the maximum regional forage income increased by
4%, while the total litter use remained unchanged.
The saved income from the permit system could
serve as an upper boundary on transaction costs.
Conclusions
This paper examines four litter management poli-
cies in terms of their efficiency, impact on optimal
litter use, and practicality in implementation. We
use a linear programming model to formulate the
regional forage income maximization problem for
the Muddy Fork watershed of the Illinois River in
northwest Arkansas.
Witi $0 opportunity cost and a tax rate of $0,
$5,$10, or $15 per ton of litter, the optimal rate of
litter application was unchanged at 3.02 tons per
acre. When the opportunity cost of litter was in-
creased to $2.50 per ton, the optimal litter use
dropped to 2 tons per acre at litter tax of $15 per
ton. With $0 opportunity cost of litter, a land tax of
$50, $75, and $100 per acre, reduced the litter
treated land by 50%, 38Y0,and O~orespectively.
With an opportunity cost of $7 per ton, it was not
optimal to apply any litter at any of the three tax
rates. The results indicate that a tax per ton of litter
applied could achieve the same level of litter con-
trol as that of a land tax on litter applications at a
lower tax rate. Although a lower tax rate causes
less distortion in the economy, it is more difficult
to monitor a litter tax than a land tax.
Quantity restriction was imposed through either
a restriction on the amount of litter applied or a
restriction on the land treated with litter. With the
restriction on the quantity of litter applied, the op-
timal litter rates ranged from Oto 4 tons per acre
depending on the soil series. With the restriction on
the land treated with litter, the total acres treated
with litter declined to 7970 and the maximized re-
gional forage income declined to 97?i0 with no
change in the litter use when compared with un-
constrained maximization. In the case of a permit
system for the land treated with litter, the total
acres treated with litter increased by 27Y0,and the
maximum regional forage income increased by 490
when compared with the quantity restriction sce-
nario. The results also indicate that a permit system
could achieve the same level of litter control as a
quantity constraint, but at a lower cost to growers
as indicated by the regional forage income.
The analysis assumes that land is used for fescue
and berrnuda grass production. The change in pro-
duction costs, output prices, and litter output from
poultry production in the watershed may affect the
optimal solutions. The impact of distribution of
litter in the watershed and the transaction costs
associated with the permit system should also be
considered before implementation.
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